The VC model is broken

These days, the more you talk to folks about Silicon Valley’s venture capital industry, the more negative the message is becoming.

And for good reason. There’s no more patience. Last time, circa 2001, the entire VC industry got a “get-out-jail-free card” after the Internet bubble burst. That’s because the scores of new firms created in the late 1990s argued they should be forgiven for any poor performance — it was the bubble’s fault, and everyone was affected. Their investors — chief among them, the elite university endowments –agreed, and gave the VC firms more money to invest again. With most VC funds lasting for ten years, this ensured the VCs a very long life indeed.

However, several things have changed. Adeo Ressi, founder of TheFunded, the site that lets people rate venture capitalists, is the latest to try to articulate the changes with a dour set of slides. He gets some things right, and some things wrong.

TheFunded - Canarie
View SlideShare presentation or Upload your own. (tags: investing lp)

Ressi was invited to present his views to the finance and entrepreneurship faculty at Harvard Business School, a place that historically has produced a lot of venture capitalists. Ressi’s message is that the venture capital industry is fundamentally broken.

Ironically, his audience (HBS) might be part of the problem: One of the shortcomings with the VC model, Ressi argues, is that venture capitalists rely on their network of friends. Of all networks, HBS is one of the tighter ones. Needless to say, Ressi’s message wasn’t very warmly received. In fact, while blasting the old boys network is a popular thing to do, I’d actually disagree with Ressi on this point. Increasingly, you’re seeing diversity within the VC community, and they’re pushing themselves hard to find great entrepreneurs of any kind. I disagree that the Google founders were outsiders. They were part of the Stanford engineering student machine, a source of Silicon Valley magic for years.

Where I do agree with Ressi is in the ugly economics overall. Most daunting is that there’s more money being invested into venture firms than those same VC firms are generating from their investments in start-ups — in other words, Ressi argues, they’re now having a net negative affect on the economy. You’d expect this lopsided dynamic to exist temporarily in a downturn. But the worrying thing is that this state of affairs may last for quite some time.

I’m not sure how long this negative balance will last, but for now it certainly contradicts the message traditionally propagated by the VC industry — that it, that VC is a net creator of value, namely of stock market growth and job creation. That positive impact was indisputable — until now.

There are a number of key reasons why things are so ugly:

1. The early successes in the valley (Intel, Cisco, Genentech, etc) attracted so much venture capital after the late 1990s that VC became an official asset class that money investors around the world sought to get a portion of. However, this is a niche industry, and should have stayed that way. Too much money has swept in, with too few deals to accommodate it. This has distorted the economics badly. Valuations are driven up for the good companies, making it prohibitively expensive for VCs to invest. Everyone loses.

2. Others have become smarter. Larger companies put start-ups on their radar much earlier. Yahoo, Microsoft, Google, Cisco have acquired start-ups very early in their life, taking them off the market for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars — but potentially keeping some start-ups from becoming billion-dollar companies. Amazon famously balked at buying Google for about $1 billion back in 2000. That may not happen today.

3. Greed. Pure and simple. Good venture capitalists have an incentive to raise ever larger funds, because the 2 percent they get in fees on the funds can bring them millions of dollars in cushy salary and expense accounts (including private jets, at least in the good old days). But to put all that money to work, the investor can’t focus on early-stage companies, because those small companies can’t absorb enough dollars. So greedy VCs turn to invest tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars into each company. That’s why there was this rush to invest at the lastest stage possible, namely private equity. There’s major pain in that sector right now, because there’s no way for anybody to liquidate their investments. This is something we saw coming a while ago; we’re surprised people supported the Blackstone IPO; it was so obviously set for failure.

Is it really all gloom and doom?

I remember meeting Draper Fisher Jurvetson partner Tim Draper in mid-2000, when it had first become clear that the first Internet bubble had permanently burst. At the time, to my surprise, he exhorted me to be positive in my reporting, that is, to show the good side of the valley and not dwell on the bad. Of course, I largely ignored him. I ended up writing about three years worth of aggressive, negative coverage of the industry and its fallout, and didn’t make a lot of friends.

But I’ll never forget how sanguine Draper was — and how in the end, his view proved to have merit even though it sounded so absurd at the time. While Benchmark’s Bob Kagle predicted a huge shakeout in the industry (half of all firms would disappear in a few years, he said ) that shakeout actually didn’t happen. The number of VC firms actually grew through 2005 or so. DFJ itself thrived, making big money from companies like Skype and Baidu. Draper was only half right, of course. He said that venture investing would remain strong, and possibly even grow. VC investing dropped back down to where it was before the bubble, but it did remain solid and grew through last year.

It is noteworthy, then, that I found myself yesterday contacting Tim Draper again, upon hearing that his firm DFJ is raising a large $800 million fund. Just like last time, the economy and overall investment environment has deteriorated badly. Limited partners (the institutions that give money to VC firms like Draper’s) are panicking and some are actually having trouble making good on their existing commitments (not meeting capital calls). Why on earth would DFJ think it could raise a fresh big fund in this environment?

Draper declined to comment on his firm’s fundraising efforts, but here’s what he said:

It wouldn’t be a bad idea to spread some VC good will around about now. Washington could stand to hear about Venture Capital job creation and wealth building. After all, ours is the asset class that may be able to pull the US out of this mess. You might also go on an anti-Sarbox rampage. That might be the regulation that has sucked the most value out of the entrepreneurial economy in the last 5 years.

In other words, we’re back to where we were ten years ago. The bubble a decade ago inspired a new set of regulations — known as Sarbanes Oxley — that forced startups to be much more conservative with their reporting and which required more burdensome auditing. The VCs complained about it — until the IPO market opened up in 2005-2007. Now that’s over, and we’re facing the possibility of an even more severe drought. That’s because there will be less mercy for VC firms this time around. And thus the plea not to focus too much on all this negativity. For Draper, such positivity is his natural demeanor. DFJ is widely known as the most aggressive venture firm in the valley — offering much larger amounts of money for an ownership stake in start-ups than other VC firms offer.

However, a lot of VCs are likely to go under this time. This asset class significantly underperformed other asset classes between 1998 and 2006. A handful of firms — Sequoia, Kleiner, Benchmark, Accel and a handful of others — have pulled up the average performance somewhat, because they’ve produced an inordinate amount of the successes (a small group of homeruns, the eBays and the Googles, account for 25 percent of total VC returns over the past 20 years; see Ressi’s slides). But if you invest in the average firm, you’re doing very poorly. So limited partners will probably shift from endowments and foundations increasingly to fund-of-funds and sovereign wealth funds.

So, yes, the VC model is badly broken. This time, Bob Kagle’s statement about half of all VCs going out of business is more likely to be true.

[Photo:flickr/Duke LeNoir]

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About the Author, Matt Marshall

Matt Marshall is editor and CEO of VentureBeat.

  • Jerry S.
    VCs are an asset to the U.S. economy, yet they need to adapt as well. More deals in less cash intensive operations and lower expectations ($50MM rev, 5-7 years to get there). How to do it? Much , much lower valuations. That should be the founders contribution to fixing the mess - letting the VC in with $3M - $5m in series A for 40% - 45% of the company.
  • Not sure the model is broken. It is just going through traditional economics of supply and demand.
    During a period, VC funds offered higher than average returns. This drew in additional capital. As you pointed out, this increased the fund sizes and dollars chasing deals, thus reducing the returns.
    As the returns drop relative to other asset classes, we will see money leave these funds. Over time, the market will stabilize.
  • Ressi has some good points. Although it's never been cheaper to communicate with a large audience, private investment is still confined to a relatively tiny set of networks.

    The problem is that these networks are protected from competition with any real alternative means of financing by... the SEC. The rules for private placements effectively prevent entrepreneurs from leveraging new technology to their advantage in reaching out to potential investors. Until the SEC rules change, not much is going to disrupt the power structure within VC and PE.

    On the other hand, I think the serious mismatch between the supply of new product ideas and the supply of business teams to execute good ones is going to get corrected by investors with a renewed focus on IP.
  • Yes, the VC model is broken. But, let's work on the assumption that the VC industry is really is loosely segmented into 2 parts: Seed level investing ($250K +/-) and Series A/B +++ investing (let’s call this the “traditional VC industry”).

    As for the traditional VC industry - It is real hard to upset folks who are pulling down big bucks cashing in their 2% management fee checks. And, it is real hard to upset folks who sanctify those who have sold profitless companies to overvalued companies. The first problem to be solved must be the Business Model/Economic problem.

    The answer is in realigning the Business Model/Economic part of the traditional VC industry. The answer to the Economic part of this problem is based on the same solution to any Buyer/Seller negotiation – somewhere between Adam Smith’s “self interest and division of labor” and the Wayans’ Brothers “Mo’ Money.”

    The most broken part of the Venture Capital Industry is the Seed level. And, in addressing the needs and opportunities of the Seed level of the VC industry, you also reform some of the broken parts of the traditional VC industry - Series A/B through Equity Event.

    The data shows Angels investing more dollars – but in fewer companies. The data shows Angels investing more and more in follow on rounds. The data shows that traditional VC firms recognize the Seed Funding problem by setting up in-house “seed” funds such as Charles River’s “Quickstart and offerings from Venrock, Battery and others.

    At the same time, the data shows, as Mike Maples said, “$500,000 is the new $5 million.” By solving the problems of Seed level investing you bring stronger companies to traditional VC investing with less money. You bring companies to traditional VC investing which can negotiate on a much more level playing field.

    The solution to realigning the Venture Capital industry so that the Seed level efficiently does what it is supposed to do require addressing 3 areas:

    1) How do you Source good Seed level companies and provide post-investment oversight in a cost justifiable manner. Sure can’t do it by having entrepreneurs email in their business plans to the high rent / high compensation offices of the traditional VC? The Seed investing business model is different than the traditional VC investing business model – simple as that.

    2) How do you generate investment in the large number of strong Seed companies needed to make Seed Funding a viable business and not either a Hobby or a Public Relations gambit? How do you overcome geographic constraint?

    3) How do you change the attitude of “Entrepreneurs Genuflect while VCs Pontificate?” – most entrepreneurs would either have a root canal than see a VC or suffer from Stockholm Syndrome and are actually thankful when a VC returns a phone call.

    The Business Model/Economics of traditional VC investing will not be fixed until the Seed investing level is fixed. The Business Model/Economics of traditional VC investing will not be fixed until VC firms truly understand the concept of vertical integration and division of labor.

    The Business Model/Economics of traditional VC investing will not be fixed until traditional VCs understand that 2 separate entities must be established: (1) a Seed Fund which works with and supports the Entrepreneurial Community and (2) a traditional Venture Capital Fund which brings companies to an equity event.

    Stop trying to force the needs and opportunities of Seed level investing into the rules and requirements of traditional VC investing and vice versa.

    What is needed is a Seed Fund that works with, supports and compensates the Seed Infrastructure (Incubators, University Tech Transfers, Economic Development Agencies).

    The solution can be found in the powerpoint presentation for The START Fund.
  • I actually don't think VC's are to blame at all. It's the institutions that are to blame, if anything... Sure VC investments are risky; however, VC's don't have the money to say yes to 25% -- If you want things to change, go to the government, go to Calpers or any of the big money pots and ask them to increase their VC allocation :-)

    That's cool he created a slideshow to demonstrate his idea. But ideas are worthless. Act.
  • Crisp narrative, Matt.

    I been plugged into three major financial crashes during my career (S&L Crisis, Internet Bubble burst, Now), and the one consistent thread that I have seen is that whenever there is an excess supply of capital, it will inevitably be deployed in inefficient and (ultimately) destructive manners. Period.

    After all, who among us has the discipline to say "ENOUGH" when the funds are available on favorable terms, our comp is tied to same, we are fundamentally optimists and we have enough proof (based on past performance) to suggest that we can hit the ball out of the park in a game designed for homerun hitters?

    Hence, even if your/Kagle's conclusion is right, less clear is what the post-implosion world looks like.

    Fewer mega-funds doing deals the same way as today, smaller funds designed for scaled down liquidity prospects…?
  • excellent piece matt.

    (and good commentary by Elliot Dahan above, altho i disagree with some of his conclusions).

    i think elliot is correct to segment & analyze performance of seed-stage investors separately.

    the real problem / opportunity is that:
    1) only big VC funds are broken; small ones can do very well
    2) however, most small funds & angels have the same crappy filtering & selection as big funds
    3) seed funds / small investments (<$2-5M, ideally $250K-$1M) with appropriate selection can have excellent returns

    most VC funds have been raising larger & larger amounts fo capital, while the capex rqmts for startups have been getting ever smaller & smaller, and exits while more numerous have also been getting smaller & smaller (more smaller M&A, less big IPO). the VCs are *way* out of whack with market realities, and have not adjusted their fund size or investment size to match.

    small seed funds that invest $250K-$2M, and who are quite happy with exits in the $10-50M range, will do very well in this new market environment (assuming their investment selection is good, and their niche expertise is helpful). these folks -- Mike Maples, Jeff Clavier, Ron Conway the incubators like Y-Combinator, TechStars, SeedCamp, and a few larger VC funds like First Round & Union Square Ventures -- are positioned to do very well in this new structure.

    Brand-name Big firms like Sequoia, Benchmark, Accel & a few other will probably still do well also, but everyone inbetween is going to get creamed.

    hard.
  • Dave -

    Thanks for reading my post. You write "altho i disagree with some of his conclusions" - which conclusions ? I'd like to have as defensible a presentation as possible - I'd als0 like to leap tall buildings in a single bound.

    My email = elliott@thegrowthgroup.com
  • Dave,

    Your point about smaller funds doing better makes a lot of sense to me. I think the community would be well-served to see a return of the evergreen fund with smaller pots. That way, the incentive is not in asset gathering to mooch off the management fee but rather to generate great returns. Returns are greatest in the seed stage, even if your scenario of smaller exits with increased frequency remains true.
  • sudeep
    I think point #2 is right on the money. Too many mee-too firms gets funded and this casuses wasted investments.

    Like all asset classes, VC industry has attracted too much capital to be allocated prudently. The shakeout is long due
  • The only thing broken about VCs is the lack of liquidity which causes the junior VCs to freak out when ventures don't go the way that they "think".

    Dave: You forgot to mention True Ventures who are doing quite well and actively investing.

    I predict that you'll see some reform in VC in form of a new kind of firm around some of the capabilities that Dave talks about. In general the capital markets (which the VCs are) are a good thing. No liquidity is a bad thing and has a 'trickle down' effect.
  • John,

    I think that reform you speak of might come in the form of a return to evergreen funds that do not have a limited lifespan. They will also be smaller as Dave McClure suggests. This will keep the focus on sustainability and generating consistent steady returns rather than the big VC model of gathering as many assets as possible and living off the management fees while having to chase big deals in order to put sufficient money to work. I was part of the founding team at the largest student-run venture fund and we were lucky to have had two billion dollar IPOs on the NASDAQ and we found that managing a smaller pot was more feasible and forced us to invest selectively with discipline.
  • Susanna K.
    I agree that the VC network seems to be highly localized. There's Silicon Valley, Boston, NYC, etc. If you're trying to develop something outside one of the main geographic areas, you're outside the network, and pretty much invisible.
  • Diogenes
    Unfortunately institutional investors go on auto pilot in their continuing funding of bad VC firms -- especially the super-sized ones. In particular, Stanford is and will be one of the particularly unfortunate ones with its dependence on the VC asset class.

    In addition, when was the last time you met a truly innovative VC? More like a herding sort of beast than an original thinker. The VC industry is starving for both entrepreneurs and VCs that actually *do* think outside the box and will take the heat for it.
  • The VC model is broken indeed, thank you for bringing it up. I discussed it in my blog ("the end of an era" one year ago - http://bizcoach.blogspot.com/2007/10/are-vcs-de...) and I agree with Eliott earlier comment that where the issue is most critical is at the seed level, this is where we need to focus if we want to fix the system, and this is where we can make the biggest impact, because entrepreneurs are the one who will fix the world issues that we face.
    This is why I have been focusing on the Entrepreneur Commons (http://www.entrepreneurcommons.org), and I see the current crisis as an opportunity to finally get people's attention on the issue. Because as Diogenes points out in the previous comment, LPs have kept things on auto-pilot so far, and for a good reason: VC investment is "alternative investment" for them, crumbs in their plate really, and they have much bigger issues to deal with (see my post "$20B crumbs" http://bizcoach.blogspot.com/2008/07/20b-crumbs...).
    We should feel lucky that all this is happening, it is time for change, a time for opportunities if we know to react smartly.
  • Sarah
    The problem isnt that VCs are Harvard MBAs, the problem is that the companies are being founded by 26-year-old Harvard MBAs.

    It used to be that tech companies were founded by geeks who created a cool technology and got funding to take it big time. Now, we have an annual migration of MBAs heading West to get their class project funded. TechCrunch and Demo are positively choked by all that crap. And see Cyprus. 26-year-old MBAs should not be funded, as a rule, unless their pet project actually gets momentum first (ala Facebook). We're not running a babysitting agency here.

    The other thing is VCs need to stop relying on EYEBALLS. What is it 1999??? One well-known Web 2.0 company that told me in a BD meeting that their investors only cared about traffic numbers, not monetezation or revenue plans (when I asked). Advertising is not the way. Insist on products that someone might actually want to buy. I know that sounds shocking, but...

    That's the one good thing about this bust. Those kiddies head back to whatever midwestern town they originally hailed from before professors and alums filled their heads with Tesla dreams, and the geeks get back to innovating. I'm seeing some cool stuff happening in garages all over the Bay, no MBAs needed. I hope the VCs are noticing.
  • Matt,

    I liked your analysis. See my response to this post at: http://www.vccafe.com/what-broke-the-vc-model/
  • The venture capital business is fundamentally a financial services business. My belief is that like most other financial service sector industries now, it will be forced to consolidate and shrink, due to under-performance. There is still too much money chasing too few deals that will ever exit for decent returns.
  • Actually you are right that VC have evolved towards being financial guys, when really they should not. Vinod Koshla said it all in a recent interview (http://venturehacks.com/articles/khosla-society):
    >>
    We make money by building entities over the long term. We’re not in the business of transacting or doing deals. We don’t even allow that word here. It’s not buying and selling, that’s a transaction. You don’t invest in something and say I can sell it tomorrow or next year. We take a five year, ten year view and say we can build a company that can significantly change the landscape.
    <<
    VCs should be about building businesses, not being financial guys. This is what got the system broken, and this is why they should to go back to the original model of working with Entrepreneurs to help them build their business if they really want to do it right.
    Back to helping rather than profiting from entrepreneurs, and back to seed rather than later stage.
  • samwhitmore
    He may have secured an audience at HBS but someone should tell Ressi that "canary" ends in a y, not an ie.
  • Greg
    To me it looks like companies get more caught up in funding than creating something people will pay for.
  • I don't think the VC model is broken per se, it's that VC's tend to approach investment opportunities through a limited - financial and technology - set of perspectives. Investments are typically made based on business models driven by new technology or new uses for technology. While this has worked in the past, the market is too saturated for this to work any longer.

    VC's (and the entrepreneurs looking for funding) need to learn to identify the true needs of their markets, then then develop solutions that satisfy those needs. Some are fairly good at identifying market needs, but where I see it fall down again and again is in the inability to translate those needs into a viable offering. This requires an understanding of how end-users will perceive the offering, rather than what they say they want or like. Consumers are too empowered now to work around product or technology deficits.

    I've been doing this work for a long time and have helped large companies who make tangible products and services to reap billions of dollars in new revenue. Yet when I talk to VC's or entrepreneurs about this, it usually falls on deaf ears. I think Greg hit it on the head - they are too caught up in funding than creating something people will pay for. I would add that they also get too caught up in perfecting the thing they are making, than honing and communicating the value it will provide.

    We need VC's to get better at this. When and how can we get them to listen?
  • Hank
    sarah- your comment about kiddies heading back to "whatever midwestern town they originally hailed from" is indicative of what is wrong with this business... far too many in the self absorbed "Bay" have this attitude. Get off your holier than though asses and find companies and ideas that solve problems, fill needs, etc. not just some lame new gadget that only "cool" people like you will pretend to care about for a minute or two.... or you will all be eating government cheese. And deservedly so.
  • Robert
    I think John hit the nail on the head earlier when he said "There is no liquidity."

    There hasn't been a great IPO market since before the 2000/2001 bubble burst. So it's kind of M&A or bust, and now we are in a recession and it's tough to justify buying Facebook for 10 billion (I would imagine).

    Which means that all these hot startups with huge valuations have a problem. No IPO market + shrinking M&A pricetags means all you can do is hang around and wait until it gets better.

    Could they find buyers hypothetically? Sure. But not for 500 million to buy a widget.
  • VCHack
    Oh please - how the hell is a VC who spends money on behalf of others now attributing themselves to be the drivers of the US economic value creation. Tim Draper and his cohorts should take a close look at the mirror and realize that they are nothing but a post-box system transferring money from an investor to an idea creator.

    Btw, economic circumstances have changed too such that smaller companies are able to go much further on their own....so much for VC assistance....the last time I heard advice on my business from a stuffy HBS grad VC, who by nature of being an MBA, has no risk-taking capibilities, I nearly died of laughter on how off market and non- operational he was.VCs are only talented in one thing - "buying" their way onto other peoples' Boards with other peoples' money.
  • I agree very much with the overall theme of this presentation and commentary, VC is "broken". However, I strongly disagree with the conclusion that we actually need fewer, "better" VCs. In my view, part of the reason that VC performance has become so stale is that the compensation system for venture capitalists drives them ever upward in terms of fund size. If they have success with a "small" fund they will raise a larger one.

    A friend just recently closed a $250mm fund after being part of several smaller funds. Over dinner his comments to me were essentially that the partnership did not actually expect they would make returns in this new, larger fund. But, on the other hand, the 3 partners would be splitting over $8mm per year in fees between the various funds. He is activity investing in real estate on the side. Have any of you ever met a VC partner that wasn't "rich"? The data would indicate that the majority of these people are not making money for their investors?

    In general, I believe it is much harder to make good returns with larger funds. If a company is raising $50mm there will be intense competition by investors trying to get money to work. On the other hand, in today's environment, if a company needs $3mm they are dead in the water no matter how good the company and deal. So few investors are doing those deals. For a fund group with $500mm under management a 10X return on a $3mm investment just doesn't "move the needle" and it isn't worth the hassle.

    So, I think the right answer is that the groups that invest in funds need to think hard about sponsoring the next generation of fund managers. We need to create 10 $50mm funds for every one $500mm fund. I know this will be difficult because pension funds are massive and it is tough to deploy into small funds. But, if we don't somehow restart the "farm team" system I fear the end of venture capital is not far off.
  • JDD
    Matt - you should talk to Paul Deninger at Jefferies/Broadview – he agrees that there is far too much VC money chasing a few good deals here in the U.S., and I believe he has stats showing that European VCs have a much better “asset class ROI” than their U.S. counterparts. He was emphatic about it on a panel discussion I attended a few months ago.
  • harryy
    VCs are financial intermediaries. As such, there are two sides to the equation: the entrepreneur side and the investor (LP) side and each has a role to play in the system.
    While the entrepreneur side knowledge base developed over the last 20 years tremendously, the LP side remains almost unchanged, despite the fact that LPs have the higher stake in the success/failure of VC backed companies.... Clearly, this is the broken component in the system, inducing its inefficiency to the other side too.
    I don't think the system is broken but is clearly not optimal and now is the right time to fix it. Debates like these (Adeo, Matt and al.) are essential to trigger a change, even if the optimal equilibria is not clear.
  • "Too much money has swept in, with too few deals to accommodate it. This has distorted the economics badly. Valuations are driven up for the good companies, making it prohibitively expensive for VCs to invest. Everyone loses."

    You touched on the crux of the issue right there, but it applies to the financial industry as a whole and not just VC. Capital is overvalued and the new bubble. While investment in human capital (the infrastructure that makes people more productive has been in steady decline for the last half century.) There is a magic formula of capital + labor + innovation (technology and entrepreneurship) that equals success. Developing and empowering our human capital for long term success has taken a back seat to throwing money around to the point where there is no longer return on investment for the most part.
  • Here are some further thoughts on the presentation and the VC model in a written form:

    http://www.adeoressi.com/2008/11/15/the-vc-mode...
  • I'm so glad that we we are working to make some change in this field. with Grow VC. www.growvc.com will be more than current VC or Angel business model on steroids. Grow VC will break the mold and restructure a new better working model for new international start-up ventures. Grow VC will change the way new ventures will be funded...
  • One way or another capital will make some flow changes, but in the end will find it's interest. Always have been, always will.